Intellectual Property Treaties and Development by Shabalala, Dalindyebo & Sanders, Anselm Kamperman
University of Dayton
eCommons
School of Law Faculty Publications School of Law
11-1-2014
Intellectual Property Treaties and Development
Dalindyebo Shabalala
University of Dayton, dshabalala1@udayton.edu
Anselm Kamperman Sanders
Maastricht University
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/law_fac_pub
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in School of Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more information, please contact frice1@udayton.edu,
mschlangen1@udayton.edu.
eCommons Citation
Shabalala, Dalindyebo and Sanders, Anselm Kamperman, "Intellectual Property Treaties and Development" (2014). School of Law
Faculty Publications. 57.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/law_fac_pub/57
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2178423 
2
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TREATIES
AND DEVELOPMENT
Prof. Anselm Kamperman Sanders
Dalindyebo Shabalala
Introduction
The inclusion of issues of harmonization and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) in the setting of the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations was commonly understood to be a balancing act: promoting 
industrialized country interests in return for greater access by developing 
countries to markets for their goods and agricultural products. In the 
multilateral setting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and more 
specifically the TRIPS Agreement, this quid pro quo approach was hailed as a 
global breakthrough for IP rights holders. With the TRIPS Council to provide a 
platform for ensuring TRIPS compliance, and with the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding in place to resolve differences without trade wars, 
the future development of intellectual property law seemed set for 
multilateralism. TRIPS also seemed to be a success for the strategy of shifting 
forums from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), where 
norm-setting had been halted since the 1970’s, to the WTO. 
However, subsequent developments suggest that the TRIPS 
Agreement was not as unequivocal a success for industrialized country IP 
right holders as they would have wished.  Issues such as protection for clinical 
test data, parallel importation, protection of geographical indications, patents 
on plants and plant genetic resources and especially IP enforcement 
remained largely unresolved.  In addition, the realization by many developing 
countries that the trade-off between greater market access and greater IP 
protection may not have worked out in their favor created a backlash to the 
TRIPS Agreement. Developing countries renewed their historical skepticism 
towards claims that higher intellectual property standards, established through 
international treaties, would lead to better development outcomes through 
innovation and technology transfer.  They blocked further harmonization 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2178423 
initiatives at WIPO such as the proposed Substantive Patent Law Treaty1 and 
delayed others such as the WIPO Treaty on the Protection of Broadcasting 
Organizations2. They also kept issues such as such as stricter norms on 
intellectual property enforcement essentially off the WTO agenda. They began 
instead to seek changes to existing international instruments at the WTO and 
at WIPO that they believed would make extant norms more favorable to 
developing countries.  At the WTO, this resulted in the Doha Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health3, and ongoing proposals for disclosure of origin of 
genetic resources.4 At WIPO, this included beginning negotiations for treaties 
on the protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore.5
As a result of this shift, the WTO and WIPO began to seem like less 
favorable venues for increasing IP standards and enforcement.  In the decade 
from 2000 to 2010, this resulted in a shift of focus by a number of 
industrialized countries, which still wanted to achieve higher standards but in 
bilateral and regional free trade negotiations (“FTAs”), covering trade and 
investment issues. There was also an accompanying increase in bilateral 
investment treaty (“BIT”) activity.  Many developing countries signed BITs and 
FTAs but the number of these has already begun to decline significantly. This 
does not necessarily mean a return to multilateral fora but suggests that new 
plurilateral fora, such as the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)6, 
and the current Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations (TPP) probably 
represent the next forum shift. This chapter explores the flourishing of 
bilateralism and plurilateralism against the backdrop of the remaining 
controversies, flexibilities, and loose ends of the TRIPS Agreement.  We look 
at the ways in which competing narratives about the relationship between 
innovation, economic development and greater intellectual property protection 
1 See WIPO “Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty” Available at: http://www.wipo.int/patent-
law/en/draft_splt.htm (last visited 19 February 2014).
2 See WIPO “Broadcasting Organizations” 
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/activities/broadcast.html (last visited 19 February 2014).
3 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001)
4 WTO “Draft decision to enhance mutual supportiveness between the TRIPS agreement and 
the Convention on Biological Diversity: Communication from Brazil, China, Colombia, 
Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru, Thailand, the ACP group, and the African group” TN/C/W/59,
19 April 2011. 
5 WIPO, “Intergovernmental Committee” http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc/ (last visited 19 
February 2014).
have both pushed and pulled against the pursuit of bilateralism and 
plurilateralism in the post-TRIPS era. 
Part I Investment and Intellectual Property
One of the keys to development, for a developing nation, is the ability to 
attract investment, both domestic and foreign, in part because technology is 
becoming a larger component of transactions both within and across countries 
globally. For example, flows of intangibles such as patents, know-how and 
other intellectual capital grow larger every year. Between 2005 and 2012, 
payments for the use of intellectual property rose from approximately 141 
Billion USD in 2005 to 213.7 billion USD in 2012, with a peak of 241.5 billion 
USD in 2011. 7 Investment (foreign and domestic) in a knowledge-based 
economy is central to any effort seeking to bridge the gap in development 
between markets in developing nations and markets in developed nations.8 
But what is the role of intellectual property in economic development? 
Because of their monopolistic nature, many economists approach IPRs with a 
great deal of caution.  One can approach the topic along two different paths. 
The first is to consider the role that intellectual property plays in enabling 
domestic innovation and economic growth; the second is to focus instead on 
the role that intellectual property plays in enabling FDI that transfers 
technology through formal and informal spill-overs.
Intellectual property and national innovation
6 See Änti-Counterfeting Trade Agreement” Available at: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/acta.html (last visited 19 February 2014). 
Japan is the depositary state. Participants included Australia, Canada, the European Union 
(EU), Japan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland and the United 
States of America. Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Morocco, New Zealand, 
Singapore and the United States signed on 1 Oct 2011. The EU and some EU member states 
signed it on January 26, 2012, but the EU as a whole did not ratify the treaty at the EU level 
after it was rejected by the European Parliament. 6 instruments of ratification are required for 
the ACTA to enter into force. (Article 39). After ratification by Japan in October 2012, there 
have been no further ratifications, and the agreement has yet to enter into force.
7 World Bank, “Charges for the use of intellectual property, payments (BoP, current US$)” 
Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BM.GSR.ROYL.CD/countries?display=graph 
(last visited 19 February 2014).
8 C Braga, K Fink and C Sepulveda, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Economic 
Development’, World Bank Discussion Paper No 412 (World Bank, 2000); see also R Mansell 
and U When (eds.), INK—Knowledge Societies: Information Technology for Sustainable 
Development (Oxford University Press, 1998).
We begin with the general role that intellectual property plays in 
encouraging domestic innovation. Free and unrestricted competition lies at 
the heart of the generally accepted western economic theory—free play of 
market forces. Free competition between enterprises is thought to be the best 
means to satisfy supply and demand and to maximize wealth in society as a 
whole. Central to this proposition is the axiom that market participants can 
compete on a level playing field so that all competitors face the same market 
barriers, thus facilitating freedom of entry into the market. From this point of 
view, legal interference in the market should be kept to a minimum. This does 
not mean, however, that the policy towards markets should be one of laissez 
faire. There is a compelling argument for laissez faire policy insofar as 
interference in the market brings with it administrative costs that are incurred 
from the transfer of the costs of competition from one market participant to the 
other. Therefore, market intervention should result in a clear social benefit, 
such as the release of more low-priced high quality products for which there is 
consumer demand. In competitive markets, the process of spreading market 
information helps to shape the opinions of market participants with regard to 
profit-making activities,9 and is seen as socially beneficial. Government 
intervention to enhance this aspect of competition is thus generally 
acceptable, even in classical economic theory. This adage gives rise to the 
premise in neo-classical theory that perfect knowledge will induce a situation 
where the spontaneous interaction between knowledge possessors will lead 
to a state of equilibrium and the optimum distribution of resources in society.10 
This means that disturbances in knowledge creation, leading to imperfect 
knowledge, need to be countered. Therefore, legal interference should aim to 
provide a level playing field of ‘market information’ in which perfect knowledge 
induces perfect competition. Laws on the protection of intellectual property 
and competition can be seen in this light. Entitlements are allocated to specific 
creators11 to safeguard valuable information generated by them against 
expropriation, so that bargaining for or around the use of such information can 
come into existence and promote a viable market. With most intellectual and 
industrial creations, the establishment of a market for ideas is possible only if 
the value of the idea can be evaluated or at least ‘guesstimated’ in advance. 
This generally means revealing that idea to a potential buyer, who will then 
9 F Hayek, ‘Economics and Knowledge’ in Individualism and Economic Order (University of 
Chicago Press, 1948) 106: ‘[c]ompetition is essentially a process of the formation of opinion: 
by spreading information [i]t creates the views people have about what is best and cheapest’.
10 R Cooter and T Ulen, Law and Economics (2nd edn, Addison Wesley, 1997) Chapter 2.
11 The term creator is used in a broad sense here and includes inventors and innovators 
independently of the speicifc IP entitlement(s) which may protect their ‘creations’.
already have acquired the idea at no cost.12 Intellectual property will then play 
a role in controlling certain uses of that disclosed information.  In the following 
pages, we review how this applies to different intellectual property rights. 
The role of government intervention through the creation of a right 
facilitating such a bargaining process (and the related creation of a market) 
has been demonstrated in the case of copyright. After the creation of the 
entitlement, the role of the state is essentially complete. This means that the 
transfer of the entitlement is left to the market, where a voluntary bargain can 
be made between buyer and seller. This implies that the value of the 
entitlement is also determined by the market and not by the state, unless the 
state considers the market to have failed13 and chooses to impose a 
compulsory license as a remedial step. This means that the value 
determination and maximization typically require very little state intervention.14 
This is not altogether surprising. According to the Coase Theorem, the 
allocations of initial entitlements by the state are unimportant, since they are 
transferred to their ‘highest value use’ through private bargaining leaving the 
total output of the economy unaffected. One system of property rights is no 
more efficient than another in this view.15 This means, however, that the 
transaction costs of the (re)allocation of property rights and the rules 
governing the exchange determine the efficiency of one system over the 
other.16 In addition, the cost effectiveness of a protective regime depends on 
the social costs that are incurred when protection is afforded in error, and 
when the likelihood of overprotection by the system is real. 
The economic rationale for the patent system17-- commonly described 
as a system of incentives and rewards but perhaps more aptly described as a 
monopoly that creates a barrier to entry.18 This is different in some respects 
from copyright where there is no structural aim to encourage exchanges but 
12 K Arrow, ‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention’ in The Rate and 
Direction of Economic Activity Economic and Social Factors (Princeton University Press, 
1962) 609 and 615.
13 Market failure is a situation where creators are not rewarded for their creative efforts.
14 G Calabresi and A Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral’, (1972) 85 Harvard LR 1089 at 1092 and 1105.
15 R Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 J of Law and Economics, 1.
16 R Merges, ‘Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property’ (1994) 94 Columbia LR 
2655 at 2664–7
larger focus on dissemination of the created product. In fact, there is no 
pressure to disseminate, only facilitation to do so safely. In contrast, the 
patent system has a structural bias towards disclosure, which is required 
required in exchange for protection. That disclosure is meant to function as a 
market signal – that a particular research path or area has been closed off 
and other economic actors should reallocate their resources and that new 
knowledge has been made available which can be built on, adapted and 
used. This forces a licensing practice to evolve and serves two main ends. 
First, the competitor faces a market barrier, equivalent to that encountered by 
the first market entrant, thus leveling the playing field. Just like the first market 
entrant the competitor has to pay for the innovative features of his product or 
means of production. As a free-rider he would not have faced the same barrier 
to market entry as the first market entrant and there would be no incentive for 
a free-rider to be creative. Second, more creators produce a wider variety of 
works that the public may be willing to pay for. This gives the consumer more 
choice and facilitates the creation of new markets. Without the protective 
regime of the patent system, which excludes free-riders, a situation of 
asymmetric market failure could emerge. This makes it economically more 
attractive to copy than to create. Why would one spend creative energy and 
risk failure in the market when existing market success can be copied? The 
result is that creators may have fewer incentives to produce works than the 
public would be willing to pay for. The aspect of asymmetry is the situation 
where one party, the creator, faces a market barrier and the other, a copyist, 
does not.19 If a combination of market failure and asymmetry occurs, a pattern 
emerges that holds true for all forms of intellectual property law.
Just like the patent system, which serves to stimulate disclosure of the 
invention and thus encourage further development, one of the purposes of the 
copyright system is to allow for the communication and use of information 
expressed in a copyright work, either by additions to the public domain or by 
rights acquisition on a licensing basis.20 Where a new work relies on previous 
work and ideas, the new work should not benefit the copyright holder through 
17 E Kaufer, The Economics of the Patent System (Harwood Academic Publishers GmbH, 
1989) and P Heald, ‘Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics of Preemption’ 
(1991) 76 Iowa LR, 962–65.
18 H Demsetz, ‘Barriers to Entry’ (1982) 72 American Economic R, 47: ‘[t]he problem of 
defining ownership is precisely that of creating properly scaled legal barriers to entry’.
19 For a definition of asymmetric market failure and the role of intellectual property law in 
providing a remedy against the resulting loss in wealth see W Gordon, ‘Asymmetric Market 
Failure and Prisoners Dilemma in Intellectual Property’ (1992) 17 University of Dayton LR, 
853.
monopoly rents in excess of the value the new work has added to total 
welfare.21 It would be wasteful competition22 to gain benefits on the basis of the 
value of the underlying work, which often consists of contributions by others 
that may already be in the public domain, or never have been susceptible to 
copyright.23 If there are many potential users of the work, it may become too 
costly to negotiate individual licences for every use that is made of it. This is 
especially true when works have become de facto industry standards, which 
may be the case in database, software,24 and ICT industries, where 
appropriate pricing according to “Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory” 
(FRAND) terms turns out to be difficult. In such cases, patent control of a 
standard imposes an absolute barrier to participation in the market where the 
patent holder refuses to license or will only license on terms that make 
reasonable competition impossible or unlikely to occur at the level of the 
product category. Examples include the series of cases in Europe relating to 
the Orange Book Standard for rewritable optical disk media25 and the 
intervention by the European Commission in the series of licensing disputes 
between Apple and Samsung.26 
The trademark system displays different characteristics, in that it was 
not envisaged as a system of incentives and rewards, but as a regulation of 
20 For a representation of traditional patent and copyright protection and the varying level of 
creativity required, see E Mackay, ‘Legal Hybrids: Beyond Property and Monopoly?’ (1994) 94
Columbia LR, 2630.
21 W Landes and R Posner, ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’ (1989) 18 J of 
Economic Studies 325, 347–353, offer the economic rationale for not protecting ideas.
22 S Besen and L Raskind, ‘An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property’ 
(1991) J of Economic Perspectives 3, 5.
23 F Warren-Boulton, K Baseman and G Woroch, ‘The Economics of Intellectual Property 
Protection for Software: The Proper Role for Copyright’ (1995) 3 Standard View, 68–78.
24 See US v Microsoft 97 F Supp 2d 59 (JS App 253–279). The findings of fact of the District 
Court are reported at 84 F Supp 2d 9 (JS App 46–246). The conclusions of law of the District 
Court are reported at 87 F Supp 2d 30 (JS App 1–43). The final judgment of the District Court 
is reported at 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (J.S. App. 253-279). The order of the District Court certifying 
the case under the Expediting Act is found at JS App 284–285, 20 June 2000. The settlement 
information and final (modified) judgment of 7 September 2006, are available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms_index.htm>.
25 See Orange-Book-Standard (BGH, 5/6/2009 – KZR 39/06) [German Federal Supreme 
Court]; 
marketing efforts.27 As an identifier of products and their sources, a trademark 
performs the role of a communicator, a messenger that spreads information 
about what is best, the level and consistency of quality, and what is cheapest. 
Protection of trademarks ensures that the consumer can make correct 
purchasing decisions,28 thus lowering the transaction costs.29 The ‘confusion 
rationale’ is also expressed in the doctrine of passing off, where it also serves 
to prevent the consumer from incurring increased transaction costs by 
seeking to minimize a consumer’s potential for confusion, guaranteeing to the 
marketer that his or her message is heard without interference. 
Protection of trade secrets is underpinned again by the notion of 
incentives and rewards, but may be located in the realm of unfair competition 
law.30 As an item of sensitive information, a trade secret may have commercial 
value and may attract the interest of competitors. Here lies one of the major 
differences from the fixed costs associated with obtaining a patent, in that the 
value of the trade secret and the costs that have to be incurred in order to 
protect it are directly related to the willingness of another to try to steal it. The 
parties do not bargain themselves, nor are they able to, since one of the 
parties intends to keep the asset secret. A regime that protects trade secrets, 
therefore, veers towards a ‘liability-rule-based system’ in which the transfer of 
an entitlement is protected and its value determined by the state. In the patent 
system, independent invention, reverse engineering and public disclosure do 
26 European Commission Press release “Antitrust: Commission opens proceedings against 
Samsung” Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-89_en.htm?locale=en (last 
visited 19 February 2014).
27 W Cornish and J Phillips, ‘The Economic Function of Trademarks: An Analysis With Special 
Reference to Developing Countries’ (1982) 13 Int’l R of Industrial Property and Copyright 
Law, 41; N Economides, ‘The Economics of Trademarks’ (1988) 78 Trade Mark Reporter, 
523; W Landes and R Posner, ‘Trademark Law: an Economic Perspective’ (1987) 30 J of Law 
and Economics, 265.
28 According to S Diamond, ‘The Public Interest and the Trademark System’ (1980) 62 J of 
the Patent Office Soc, 529, the consumer is the ‘unnamed third party in every action for 
trademark infringement, since the interest of the consumer lies in the ability of the trademark 
to facilitate choice on the basis that a trademark guarantees uniformity of quality at a 
consistent level’.
29 G Akerlof, ‘The Market for “Lemons”, Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ 
(1970) Q J of Economics, 488, demonstrated that this also applies to the quality function of 
the trademark. In his work he succinctly describes the market breakdown that occurs when 
the consumer can no longer trust the quality message a mark convers.
30 Besen and Raskind, note 17 above, 23–4.
not detract from the proprietary right in the patent,31 but in the case of trade 
secrets they do. Someone who sets out to uncover and apply another’s trade 
secret may bring about social gain by increasing competition, but equally he 
may reduce the incentive to invent by inducing asymmetric market failure.32 
Trade secrecy protection serves to reduce the social costs that comprise 
expenditures for protection of trade secrets on one hand, and the cost of ‘not 
investing resources designed to effect a transfer of wealth’ on the other.33 In 
balancing those costs associated with the upkeep of a protective regime and 
the costs associated with the absence of a market structure that facilitates 
bargaining and sale of information, trade secrecy protection is limited to 
tortious interference with an entitlement that is not absolute in nature. An 
inventor relying on a trade secret cannot prevent the application of 
independent research and, if the resulting invention is patentable, he cannot 
even prevent a second market entrant from patenting the invention and 
forcing the original inventor out of the market. In the first instance, all market 
entrants face the same market barriers. This places reverse engineering, for 
example, in a peculiar position as it is not a method of independent research 
and may be considered theft. Friedman, Landes and Posner advance two 
reasons against liability for reverse engineering, namely the administrative 
cost associated with proof that independent research did not take place and 
the public disclosure argument.34 The line between piracy and acceptable 
reverse engineering often lies in the presence of substantial investment and 
innovation. This means that reverse engineering does not create a 
monopolistic barrier to entry and the investment and innovation associated 
with it do not induce asymmetry in the market, since all market entrants face 
similar market barriers.
Seen from these economic perspectives of intellectual property, the 
grant of private rights serves to create a market for intangibles that would 
otherwise be common goods, and the enforcement of IPRs serves to 
safeguard not only the investment in innovation, but the prevention of market 
failure, by erecting the same barriers to market entry for all competitors. 
31 Provided that the entitlement is enforced by the state.
32 D Friedman, W Landes and R Posner, ‘Some Economics of Trade Secret Law’ (1991) J of 
Economic Perspectives, 69–70.
33 W Landes and R Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (Harvard University Press, 
1987) Chapter 6.
34 Note 26 above, 70.
Private rights here are properly understood as entitlements which, although 
granted by the state (in the case of patents and copyright in utilitarian 
approach countries) or recognized by the state (in the case of copyright in 
natural rights approach countries); are nevertheless exercised by private 
individuals for their own personal benefit. That the aim of such a grant or 
recognition has the public welfare aim to ensure the production or distribution 
of goods that would not otherwise exist (sometime characterized as public 
goods), does not detract from the private nature of the exercise of those 
rights. This is not the same as saying that thus a private “property’ right is 
established, except in the most tangential sense. This explains why concerns 
relating to over-protection are far more prevalent in the arena of intellectual 
property, and the extent to which private actors may make private claims 
relating to their exclusive rights, are limited by the instrumental and welfare 
goals that initiated the grant of the rights in the first place.35
Nevertheless, exclusive rights (sometime property-like in nature) in 
intangibles facilitate trade in them, usually with the transfer of the underlying 
technology as a result. Without an effective IP system, innovators may shy 
away from investment and technology transfer, especially when piracy rates 
are high and the enforcement of rights is weak. Therefore, it would seem that 
it would be wise for a developing country to invest in protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property. However, although the TRIPS Agreement 
provides the international framework for IP protection and enforcement, it is 
not clear that it has served to actually provide the kind of economic 
development envisioned by classical economic justifications for protecting 
intellectual property. The question arises because of the need to differentiate 
between the existence of protection versus calibrating the appropriate level of 
protection.  The question that has come to the fore is whether the TRIPS 
Agreement is calibrated at too high a level of protection for most developing 
countries.
Generally, there is little evidence that many countries moved up the 
technology value chain with an initially high set of intellectually property 
standards.36 Whether and to what extent the TRIPS Agreement limits the 
ability to move up the value chain is both an empirical and a legal question.  
35 For a thorough examination of the limits and uses of private remedies and their implications 
for the ‘property-like’ and private nature of intellectual property law see: Lemley, Mark A., 
Taking the Regulatory Nature of IP Seriously (January 31, 2014). Stanford Law and 
Economics Olin Working Paper No. 455. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2388850 (Last visited 19 February 2014).
36 See p290, Maskus, Keith E. and Jerome H. Reichman, "The Globalization of Private 
Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods" 7 Journal of International 
Economic Law 279 (2004).
For the moment, there are no studies that point to either a positive or negative 
effect on growth from being TRIPS-compliant, although, as will be discussed 
below, there appear to be FDI effects. As Maskus points out, some of the 
concerns about the negative effects on access to technology may be 
addressed by noting that patenting tends not to occur in low-income and lower 
middle income countries37, except in specific sectors such as health and 
agriculture, primarily due to their lack of imitative capacity and small market 
size.  In addition, even where technologies may be patented there may be 
several alternatives on the market, ameliorating the pricing power that a 
patent holder would have.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to draw any conclusions 
for whether the effects on welfare (or sustainable development) are positive or 
negative38, except perhaps in very specific circumstances in specific sectors.  
Theoretically, at least, the economic literature points to significant short
term static costs to the increase of intellectual property protection39, leading to
an increased outflow of  royalties and fees.   There are of  course dynamic
effects, but in an open economy, it is not clear whether those effects would be
of a scale to off-set the static costs.40 In specific sectors such as health, there
is some mixed evidence that there may be an increase in the static costs,
without necessarily being accompanied by a lowering of the dynamic costs of
patent  protection.41 The  example  of  India  suggests  that  increased  patent
protection for pharmaceuticals did not drive increased innovation in medicines
37 See p28, Maskus, Keith E. “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” ICTSD Issue 
Paper No. 7, May 2004. Available at: www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/CS_Maskus.pdf 
(last visited 19 February 2014).
38 See p21, Fink, Carsten and Carlos Primo Braga, “How Stronger protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights affects Trade” in Maskus, Keith & Carsten Fink (eds.) Intellectual Property 
and Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 
2005).
39 See p285, Maskus, Keith E. and Jerome H. Reichman, "The Globalization of Private 
Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods" 7 Journal of International 
Economic Law 279 (2004).
40 p22, Fink, Carsten and Carlos Primo Braga, “How Stronger protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights affects Trade” in Maskus, Keith & Carsten Fink (eds.) Intellectual Property 
and Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 
2005).
41 p208, Ganslandt, Mattias et. al. “Developing and Distributing Medicines to Poor Countries: 
the DEFEND Proposal” in Maskus, Keith & Carsten Fink (eds.) Intellectual Property and 
Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 
2005).
relevant to the majority of the Indian population but resulted in an increased
focus on medicines and diseases with markets in industrialized countries.42
This suggests few dynamic benefits from increased patent protection. On the
other hand, the WHO Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation
and Public Health found that, in the period to 2006, prices for anti-retroviral
medicines  were  lowered  dramatically.43 The  Commission  attributed  this  to
increased generic competition, the TRIPS transition period and pressure on
pharmaceutical companies from NGO’s and other actors. However, it should
be  noted  that  increased  use  of  price  differentiation  and  agreements
preventing  parallel  trade  may  also  have  played  a  significant  part  in  the
lowering of prices. As Fink and Maskus44 point  out, until  more data on the
demand and price elasticities for technologies and technological products is
available,  modeling the impact  of  higher intellectual property  in developing
countries will be difficult, if not unreliable.
The level of innovation in a country, a key development indicator, is 
often measured against the number of patent applications and grants. 
According to WIPO:
Patent statistics are increasingly recognized as useful indicators of 
inventive activity and of technology flows. Patents are a unique 
information resource because they contain very detailed, publicly 
available information about inventions which can be matched with other 
indicators to provide insight into the evolution of technology . . . [T]he 
use of the patent system remains highly concentrated with only five 
patent offices accounting for the overwhelming majority of all patent 
applications in 2012: United States of America (23.1%), Japan (14.6%), 
Republic of Korea (8%), China (27.8)  and the European Patent Office 
(8%).45
42 p85, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health “Public 
health, innovation and intellectual property rights: report of the Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health” Geneva: WHO (2006). Available at: 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/ENPublicHealthReport.pdf (last 
visited 19 February 2014).
43 Id.
44 p12, Fink, Carsten and Keith Maskus “Why we study Intellectual Property Rights and what 
we have learned” in Maskus, Keith & Carsten Fink (eds.) Intellectual Property and 
Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 
2005).
45 See p6 WIPO World Intellectual Property Indicators (WIPO: Geneva 2013), available at 
Still, it is no longer self-evident that more patents equate to more innovation.
In fact a report prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations, an influential 
and independent, non-partisan foreign policy membership organization and 
think tank on foreign policy and America’s role in the world, called for a reform 
of the US patent system, noting a marked increase in the number of US 
patents, and stating:
[t]his increase in patents, however, does not necessarily correspond to 
an increase in innovation. Available evidence does not support the view 
that enhanced patent protection necessarily stimulates more 
innovation. For example, surveys of technology officers reveal that, 
except in pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and some forms of 
machinery, inventing firms do not view patents as significant reasons to 
invest in technology.46
This was one of the impetuses for the 2011 Leahy Smith America Invents Act47
which provided for post-grant opposition, a first-to-file system and significant 
changes to standards on novelty intended to weed out low quality patents.  
Thus while TRIPS may be associated with increased patenting in 
developing countries, this is not necessarily an indicator of increased 
domestic innovation in those countries. Patents have multiple uses, including 
as useful barriers to market entry against potential competitors. The growth in 
patenting in China, where much of the post-TRIPS growth has occurred48 can 
at least be partially explained by this phenomenon. More than the existence of 
patents, it may be access to the information and know how related to those 
patents that is most crucial to development. The ability to absorb knowledge 
and human capital drives the capacity to innovate.
Past economic fiascos may even prove to be beneficial for developing 
countries in this respect. For example, when the ‘dot-com bubble’ burst in 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/intproperty/941/wipo_pub_941_2013
.pdf (Last visited 19 February 2014)
46 Maskus, note 35 above, 15–16
47 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
48 See p6, WIPO World Intellectual Property Indicators (WIPO: Geneva 2013)
2001, massive investments, made during the 1990s, in high-speed networks 
spanning the globe were written off. Simultaneously, thousands of IT workers 
that had been attracted from all over the world to work in the once-
overheating Western economies were laid off. A succinct example of 
capitalizing on opportunities of technology transfer can be found in India, 
where inexpensive access to the web and returning trained human capital 
helped to propel India into the position of outsourcing haven for Western 
industry, further spawning Bangalore’s version of Silicon Valley.49 Sharing 
information and absorbing knowledge, rather than proprietizing intellectual 
effort, appears to have been key to India’s economic development. The irony 
is that the dot-com’s business model relies on bringing about network effects 
by giving products away to build market share. In such a scheme, profit must 
be realized later, essentially through brand awareness and additional higher 
end services that are not free of charge. In Silicon Valley, the dot-com 
survivors took the whole of the available market while others perished. 
Bangalore, on the other hand, was not really a survivor, but an heir to the dot-
com legacy. This example shows that the capacity to absorb technology and 
human capital, rather than the intellectual property system in and by itself, is 
the key to economic development. Therefore, in order for people to absorb 
science, technology and research, they need to be educated. Developing 
countries without a trained population will not be able to participate optimally 
in the global knowledge economy. A set of firms with internal imitative, 
adaptive and R&D capacity is crucial to creating domestic momentum for 
innovation50 rather than simply increasing patent protection. In fact, increased 
patent protection may pose a barrier to those very firms with the capacity to 
imitate. 
The effects on second mover firms and countries are not just limited to 
the patent arena. A report on access to knowledge by Consumers 
International’s Asia Pacific Office points to the negative effects, brought about 
by heightened standards in copyright protection and enforcement in 
developing countries. Implementation of TRIPS Agreement obligations, in 
particular, appears to act as a barrier to accessing books, journals and 
49 See T Friedman, The World is Flat (2nd edn Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), in which he 
describes how in a triple convergence the combination of the PC with the microprocessor, 
internet, and fiber optics enabled citizens to interact, collaborate, access information and 
innovate globally, giving rise to a global community. On the issue of India’s transformation 
from socialism to global trade, see pp. 214–224 and 561: ‘India only twenty years ago, before 
triple convergence, was known as a country of snake charmers, poor people, and Mother 
Teresa. Today its image has been recalibrated. Now it is also seen as a country of brainy 
people and computer wizards.’
50 For an extended discussion on enabling such learning through firm clustering, see Daniel 
Gervais’ piece in this book.
teaching materials. In fact the price of books has increased upon 
implementation to the extent that many materials are no longer accessible. 
According to the report:
[t]he Berne Convention (1886) . . . specified limitations and exceptions 
to the rights it conferred. These limitations and exceptions were further 
expanded in the Appendix (1971) due to representations made by 
developing countries. . . . The TRIPS Agreement (1995) altered the 
balance . . . and extended copyright protection in terms of scope and 
varied the limitations and exceptions to the rights provided to copyright 
owners. Developed countries have used their influence at the WIPO 
and through bilateral and regional trade agreements to further enhance 
copyright protection. The space available to developing countries to 
adopt policy options suited to their development needs [has] 
consequently in each instrument been reduced.51
This fact is even more perverse in view of the advice contained in the 
European Commission DG Internal Market study on copyright for the 
knowledge economy, wherein flexibility in limitations and exceptions is 
deemed essential for consumers and users of copyright works in dynamic 
information markets.52 Now that developed economies have started to 
recognize that strengthening intellectual property, without providing for robust 
limitations and exceptions to these rights, may be too much of a good thing, it 
is of the utmost importance to make sure that developing trading partners are 
not encouraged or even forced to adopt a complex array of legal regimes that 
might widen the knowledge divide and decrease their ability to participate in a 
global knowledge economy which is rapidly absorbing more investment than 
physical assets do.  However, even where higher intellectual property may not 
necessarily be conducive to innovation in developing countries, there may 
nevertheless be a strong argument that such standards encourage foreign 
direct investment and increase the likelihood of licensing, thus contributing to 
development and technology transfer. The next section addresses the 
evidence for this proposition.
51 Consumers International, note 4 above, 39.
52 The Recasting of Copyright & Related Rights for the Knowledge Economy (IVIR, 2006), 
available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/etd2005imd195recast_report_2006
.pdf(last visited 19 February 2014). p III: ‘EC legislature should strive to establish a more 
flexible and forward looking regime of limitations on copyright and related rights. A non-
exhaustive list of limitations would allow Member States to respond more quickly than the EC 
legislature to urgent situations that will arise in the dynamic information market.’
Intellectual property, FDI and cross-border licensing
There exists a tension between policies aimed at encouraging foreign
firms to export, or establish themselves in your market so that needed goods
and  services  can  be  produced  and  sold,  and  those  aimed  at  ensuring
sufficient spillovers in terms of skills, know-how, information and technology to
enable  domestic  producers  to  move  up  the  value  chain  themselves  and
perhaps  even  compete  in  the  same  market.   Maskus  identities  various
channels for spillovers to occur such as: uncompensated imitation; departure
of  employees  to  competitors;  access  to  patent  data.   He  also  points  to
spillovers that are best described as efficiency savings arising from the effect
that FDI can have on the behaviour of local suppliers and competitors.53 These
include the demonstration effect of  use of new technologies in providing a
competitive advantage, especially those that are relatively easily observable;
the  efficiency  (cost  or  otherwise)  of  new  inputs  from  the  FDI  actor  for
downstream producers; the efficiency and learning for suppliers of inputs to
the  FDI  actor,  provided that  the  actor  uses local  suppliers;  departure  and
exchange of employees across firms.  
While these ideas make sense from an economic analysis perspective,
it is important that we do not take these effects as a given for most forms of
FDI.  Where FDI operates in an enclave and is primarily in export  oriented
businesses, there is a low likelihood of natural spillovers.  54 In addition, to the
extent that foreign firms engage in anti-competitive practices, spillovers are
also unduly limited.  Finally it the regulatory structure around the protection of
intellectual property that determines the nature and scale of both formal and
informal spillovers.  What kind and what level of IP protection is optimal to
ensure technology transfer through FDI? 
53 p14, Maskus, Keith E. “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” ICTSD Issue Paper 
No. 7, May 2004. Available at: www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/CS_Maskus.pdf (last 
visited 19 February 2014).
54 p68, Maskus, Keith “The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct 
Investment and Technology Transfer” in Maskus, Keith & Carsten Fink (eds.) Intellectual 
Property and Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research (Washington D.C.: 
World Bank, 2005).
The proliferation  of  bilateral  investment  treaties  aimed especially  at
restricting  requirements  for  local  content55,  or  technology  transfer,  56 for
example,  may also have made it  much more difficult  for  learning by local
suppliers to take place. This also includes measures that limit regulation of
strict  non-disclosure  and  non-compete  agreements  with  employees,  to
prevent them taking information, especially trade secrets, with them to other
employers. 
It  may be inappropriate to treat FDI as synonymous with technology
transfer57,  where  the  natural  effects  of  FDI  are  blocked  by  specifically
designed regulatory mechanisms.  In addition, there may be a natural bias
against such spillovers, given that some economic models find that the most
profitable  or  successful  affiliates  are  those  that  are  most  effective  at
preventing spillovers of proprietary and non-proprietary knowledge.58  
An  important  issue  to  note  is  that  the  dynamics  of  international
technology  transfer  have  shifted  significantly  since  1995.59 In  particular,
whereas  the  concerns in  the  pre-1995  period  involved deeply  asymmetric
relationships between industrialized and developing countries (both in political
power and technical capacity) and between multinational firms and developing
country firms, the post-WTO landscape is very different.  Barton points to a
much larger role in the economy for FDI that is export based and is not simply
focused on access to domestic markets and to a much more dispersed supply
55 See e.g. Article V.2.c, Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government 
of the Republic of South Africa on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, (signed 27 
November 1995, not yet entered into force). Available at: 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_southafrica.pdf 
56 See e.g. Article V.2.e, Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government 
of the Republic of South Africa on the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
57 As do Driffield et. al “The multinational enterprise as a source of international knowledge 
flows: Direct evidence from Italy” 41 Journal of International Business Studies 350 (2010), 
noting that firms actively work to internalize and prevent spillovers from the activities of their 
affiliates, especially where these are wholly owned. 
58 See e.g. p357, Driffield et. al “The multinational enterprise as a source of international 
knowledge flows: Direct evidence from Italy” 41 Journal of International Business Studies 350 
(2010).
59 See p1, Barton, John “New Trends in Technology Transfer: Implications for National and 
International Policy”, Issue Paper No. 18, ICTSD February 2007.
chain  for  many  products  that  are  internationally  traded.60  This  shifts  the
incentives for  multinational enterprises in terms of  how and to  whom they
provide  their  technologies.  The technical  and scientific  knowledge base in
most  developing  countries  has  also  been  transformed,  reflecting  greater
capacity  for  absorption  and  adaptation,  while  also  providing  a  possible
platform  for  R&D  and  production  for  foreign  firms  seeking  competitive
advantage for exports to other markets.61 In addition, the distance between
industrialized and developing countries, in terms of commercial  information
and capacity to take part in transactions has shrunk, increasing the ability for
even small firms to engage in international trade and transactions. Domestic
firms in developing countries also have increasingly greater integration into
global  markets,  and  are  often  significantly  focused  on  export  markets,
meaning that the intellectual property standards and rules for market access
to industrialized country markets have much more impact on policy decisions
to imitate foreign technologies.  Finally, publicly institutions and universities
have  become  greater  players  on  the  commercial  side  of  technological
transactions. 
At the very least, this new landscape implies a greater willingness and
incentive for industrialized country multinationals to site facilities and use their
best technologies in developing countries.  It also suggests a disincentive for
developing country firms to circumvent or imitate foreign technologies without
authorization because they may be shut out of international markets, and in
particular industrialized country markets.  The increase in domestic technical
capacity in developing countries, however,  also suggests that technological
catch up may be sped up, given a sufficient technological base and access to
technologies at a reasonable price.  
As  a  subsidiary  of  FDI,  key  market  based  channels  for  technology
transfer are those that relate to joint ventures.62  Joint ventures require sharing
of  technological  products,  processes  and  know  how,  simply  to  allow  the
venture to succeed. They work best when both partners bring know-how and
capital  to the table,  although these can also include specialized access to
contracting (in the case of preferential procurement policies) or goodwill etc.
To the extent that the venture is time limited, that there is an exchange of
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Maskus, Keith E. “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” ICTSD Issue Paper No. 
7, May 2004. Available at: www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/CS_Maskus.pdf (last visited 
19 February 2014).
information, technology and personnel, the ability of the partners to move on
after the joint venture is completed and having learned from each other is
extremely useful.  Joint ventures can be some of the most efficient tools for
enabling learning by the domestic partners. To the extent that joint ventures
between competitors are not the natural outcome of market behaviour, some
countries have seen fit to condition foreign investment or market access in
strategic economic sectors on the establishment of joint ventures.  China has
historically  had  such  requirements,  although  there  remains  some
disagreement  as  to  whether  these  were  successful  in  terms  of  enabling
technology transfer.63  The use of such measures however, may be restricted
by the existence of provisions in bilateral investment treaties that specifically
prohibit requiring that investments take place in the form of joint ventures by
requiring national treatment in the establishment of investments.64  This means
that it is not possible to require that foreign investment in a particular sector
take  place  only  through  joint  ventures,  without  also  applying  that  same
standard to domestic firms.
The issue of the role that IP plays as a determinant of FDI is made
problematic by discussions where we accept the assumption made by many
studies that FDI is equivalent to technology transfer. As noted above, this may
not be a safe assumption and especially in the context of regulatory structures
explicitly  aimed  at  restricting  technology  spillovers  related  to  FDI,  it  may
actually be erroneous. Caution should be exercised in evaluating studies and
data using FDI as a proxy for technology transfer.  However, in the context of
examining  the  role  that  intellectual  property  protection  plays,  there  may
nevertheless  be  useful  elements  in  that  broader  discussion  of  the
determinants of international technology transfer. Some lessons can be drawn
from the literature:
- Increased trade  in  technological  goods  can  lead  to  spillovers  in
learning as well  as enabling reverse engineering.65 However,  this
63 See e.g. Buckley, Peter J. et al. “Inward FDI and host country productivity: evidence from 
China’s electronics industry” Transnational Corporations, Vol. 15, No. 1 (April  2006) arguing 
in favor of JVs and Kinoshita, Yuko, “Technology Spillovers through Foreign Direct 
Investment”. CERGE-EI Working Paper No. 39 (December 1998). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=157614 (last visited 19 February 2014) arguing that FDI and JVs 
were not a significant factor in productivity growth from technology.
64 See e.g. e.g. Article II.3, Agreement between the Government of Canada and the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
(signed 27 November 1995, not yet entered into force). Available at: 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_southafrica.pdf
65 p17, Maskus, Keith E. “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” ICTSD Issue Paper 
No. 7, May 2004. Available at: www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/CS_Maskus.pdf (last 
requires  a  significant  learning  capacity  in  firms  and  existing
investment  in  R&D.66 There  is  evidence  from models  and  some
empirical work that higher IP protection on average increases trade,
but  there  is  no  noticeable  impact  on  trade  in  high  technology
goods.67
- As discussed above, given the appropriate regulatory environment,
FDI may also generate significant  spillovers,  both through formal
mechanisms (licensing and actual  transfer to vertically integrated
subsidiaries)  and  informal  mechanisms.68 The  evidence  from
literature is mixed,69 but leans to at least a positive effect for those
countries  with  significant  learning  capacity  in  firms  and  ongoing
investment  in  R&D.  This  is  especially  true  for  vertical  spillovers
rather than horizontal for which the evidence is far more mixed. 70
However, increasing IPR protection does not seem to be linked to
significant short term increases in FDI.71
visited 19 February 2014).
66 p33, Maskus, Keith E. “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” 
67 p35, Fink, Carsten and Carlos Primo Braga, “How Stronger protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights affects Trade” in Maskus, Keith & Carsten Fink (eds.) Intellectual Property 
and Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 
2005).
68 p8, Fink, Carsten and Keith Maskus “Why we study Intellectual Property Rights and what 
we have learned” in Maskus, Keith & Carsten Fink (eds.) Intellectual Property and 
Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 
2005).
69 p18, Maskus, Keith E. “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” ICTSD Issue Paper 
No. 7, May 2004. Available at: www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/CS_Maskus.pdf (last 
visited 19 February 2014).
70 p18, Maskus, Keith E. “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” ICTSD Issue Paper 
No. 7, May 2004. Available at: www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/CS_Maskus.pdf (last 
visited 19 February 2014).
71 p8, Fink, Carsten and Keith Maskus “Why we study Intellectual Property Rights and what 
we have learned” in Maskus, Keith & Carsten Fink (eds.) Intellectual Property and 
Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 
2005).
- Licensing  can  be  a  significant  channel  for  technology  transfer,
provided there is sufficient absorptive capacity  and capital  in the
licensee and surrounding firms.72  However, the more the licensor is
concerned that proprietary knowledge may leak, the less likely they
are to engage in arms-length transactions and the more likely they
are to license only to wholly owned subsidiaries or to joint venture
structures  over  which  they  have  significant  control.73 They  may
either  refuse  to  license  into  the  market  or  only  license  older
technologies.  Of course, the level of intellectual property protection
also plays a role  in  a  licensor’s  assessment of  likely  leakage of
proprietary technologies. Theoretically, increased patent protection
should make arm’s length licensing to unaffiliated firms more likely.74
- Intellectual property provides a way to reduce the uncertainty and
transaction  costs  associated  with  sharing  of  knowledge  across
borders and allows both providers and recipients to have secure
predictable  information  about  the  nature  and  costs  of  the
technology  which  is  the  subject  of  the  exchange.75  Intellectual
property also enables the capture of a larger proportion of the spill-
overs that would otherwise occur into an economy due to licensing,
FDI,  or  trade,  allowing  and  encouraging  a  firm  to  engage  in
transactions  into  an  economy.76  Of  course,  where  the  aim  of
policies is to maximize such spill-overs, there is a conflict between
the desires of the foreign firm and those of the industrial policy of
the  domestic  government.    This  suggests  that  need  to  also
emphasize  importance  of  appropriate  regulatory  structures  to
72 p20, Maskus, Keith E. “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” 
73 Id.
74 p114, Yang, Guifang and Keith Maskus “Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing: an 
Econometric Investigation” in Maskus, Keith & Carsten Fink (eds.) Intellectual Property and 
Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 
2005).
75 p14, Maskus, Keith “Differentiated Intellectual Property Regimes for Environmental and 
Climate Technologies”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 17, OECD Publishing 2010.
76 Id.
manage and encourage spillovers and to prevent anticompetitive
behavior.77
The  evidence  for  whether  and  in  which  circumstances  higher
intellectual property protection increases the likelihood of technology transfer
remains unclear. At best, what can be said is that, where intellectual property
is initially low and protection and enforcement increased, there is evidence
that  increased  FDI  takes  place,  especially  in  middle-income  countries.78
These  findings  do  not  seem  to  be  replicated  for  low  income  countries,
probably in large part due to the fact that they present largely uninteresting
markets for rightholders, except for perhaps in the realm of pharmaceuticals
and agriculture.  However, as Maskus points out, there are also studies that
have found little  or no correlation between levels of  patent  protection and
inward FDI even for upper middle income countries.79 There does however
appear to be a positive link between levels of IP protection and the complexity
and level of technology involved in FDI or licensing: low levels of IP protection
limit  the transfer of  high technology.80  For countries at a low level  on the
technology value chain, still moving from imitation to innovation, this may not
necessarily  be  a  bad  thing  as  the  learning  basis  for  building  innovative
capacity  will  need to  be  built  on  earlier  more  mature  technologies  before
adoption of newer, more complex ones.
FDI is usually used as a proxy for technology transfer but the studies
and data do not tell us a significant amount about the quality of that FDI, i.e.
whether it  results in best available technologies being transferred, the rate
and scale of spill-overs, and whether the transfers are vertical (into directly
owned  subsidiaries)  into  joint  ventures  or  horizontal  (into  independent
77 p69, Maskus, Keith “The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct 
Investment and Technology Transfer” in Maskus, Keith & Carsten Fink (eds.) Intellectual 
Property and Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research (Washington D.C.: 
World Bank, 2005).
78 p17, Maskus, Keith E. “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” ICTSD Issue Paper 
No. 7, May 2004. Available at: www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/CS_Maskus.pdf (last 
visited 19 February 2014).
79 Id. at p24, citing Primo Braga, Carlos A. and Carsten Fink, "The Relationship between 
Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment," 9 Duke Journal of Comparative 
and International Law 163 (1998).
80 p65, Maskus, Keith “The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct 
Investment and Technology Transfer” in Maskus, Keith & Carsten Fink (eds.) Intellectual 
Property and Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research (Washington D.C.: 
World Bank, 2005).
entities).  Maskus  also  cautions  that  the  evidence  suggests  that  it  is  the
certainty of contract enforcement and IP enforcement rather than the strength
of  IP protection that  seems to  be determinative of  decisions to  engage in
technology related market transactions.81
The data on FDI and capital goods generally does not allow one to see
whether  such  transfers  were  to  vertically  integrated  subsidiaries  or  joint
ventures or to genuine third parties, and what the scope and speed of such
transfers were, but the implication is clear.  Reforms that,  at the very least,
ensure compliance with the TRIPS Agreement provide an incentive to outside
companies to carry out FDI and sell capital and other technological goods, as
well as license, in middle income countries.  This may also encourage a shift
from FDI to licensing, although it  is not clear whether this increases arm’s
length transactions.82  Data also show however that there is little or no positive
effect for lower income or least developing countries, suggesting, as Maskus
argues, that while intellectual property is a factor, it acts in conjunction with
other market factors such as: purchasing power; market size; and domestic
absorptive capacity.83 If intellectual property protection was a key driver of FDI,
then those countries that increased their intellectual property protection the
most between 1990 and 1995 (largely sub-Saharan Africa) would have seen
the largest relative increase in FDI share, which was not the case. In fact the
region saw a significant drop in the share of FDI84,  losing out especially to
countries  like  China,  India  and  Brazil.  The  key  is  reliable,  predictable
enforcement  rather  than  IP standards  per  se.   Nevertheless,  the  level  of
intellectual  property  protection  is  a  major  factor  in  decisions  relating  to
location of R&D facilities.85  In specific sectors with low imitation thresholds,
such  as  chemicals  and  pharmaceuticals,  levels  of  IP  also  influenced  FDI
81 p22, Maskus, Keith E. “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” ICTSD Issue Paper 
No. 7, May 2004. 
82 p24, Maskus, Keith E. “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” ICTSD Issue Paper 
No. 7, May 2004.
83 p17, Maskus, Keith “Differentiated Intellectual Property Regimes for Environmental and 
Climate Technologies”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 17, OECD Publishing 2010.
84 p54, Maskus, Keith “The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct 
Investment and Technology Transfer” in Maskus, Keith & Carsten Fink (eds.) Intellectual 
Property and Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research (Washington D.C.: 
World Bank, 2005).
85 Id. at p56
decisions, although these determined whether the nature of the FDI was to a
direct and wholly owned subsidiary or to an affiliate or joint venture, rather
than deterring FDI as a whole.86
Looking at licensing specifically, the empirical studies on licensing are
few and far between and suffer from lack of access to information on the
content of licensing contracts.  The empirical case for a link between patent
strength and licensing is mixed at best.87 A proxy for licensing that is often
used  is  volumes  and  flows  of  royalties  and  other  licensing  fees.
Problematically,  it  is  difficult  to  determine  whether  increases  in  such  fees
reflect actual  increases in the number of  transactions or simply reflect  the
growth  in  market  power,  and  thus  pricing  power,  that  higher  intellectual
property  standards  and  enforcement  provide.88  Nevertheless,  the  existing
studies suggest a strong positive relationship between the level of intellectual
property protection and levels of royalty flows.89  This however, appears to
hold true only where the initial levels of IPR protection were already relatively
strong.90 At  least  one  study  found  that  the  effect  was  strongest  regarding
licensing to non-affiliates.91 Another, focusing specifically on the 1995 – 2005
86 Id. at p60, Maskus, Keith “The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign 
Direct Investment and Technology Transfer” in Maskus, Keith & Carsten Fink (eds.) 
Intellectual Property and Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research 
(Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2005).
87 See p111, Yang, Guifang and Keith Maskus “Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing: an 
Econometric Investigation” in Maskus, Keith & Carsten Fink (eds.) Intellectual Property and 
Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 
2005). See also, p542, Kanwar, Sunil “Intellectual Property Protection and Technology 
Licensing: The Case of Developing Countries” 55 Journal of Law and Economics 539 No. 3 
(2012).
88 p25, Maskus, Keith E. “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” ICTSD Issue Paper 
No. 7, May 2004. Available at: www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/CS_Maskus.pdf
89 Id.
90 p128, Yang, Guifang and Keith Maskus “Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing: an 
Econometric Investigation” in Maskus, Keith & Carsten Fink (eds.) Intellectual Property and 
Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 
2005).
91 Id.
post-TRIPS period found a positive relationship between outward royalty flows
and levels of intellectual property protection.92
There is also some evidence that stronger patent rights do shift activity
from FDI towards licensing, although much of that takes place towards local
affiliates  rather  than  horizontally,  and  is  largely  limited  to  countries  with
significant  imitative capacity.93 Data from a 2006 study done for the World
Bank suggests that where countries do indeed strengthen patent rights, there
appears to be a corresponding increase in licensing contracts by US firms to
developing country firms.94 This is in line with evidence suggesting a negative
relationship  between  the  level  of  imitative  capacity  and  the  willingness  to
license into a country.95 There are also findings that suggest that, at least with
respect to middle-income countries, strengthening patent protection increases
the likelihood of  licensing  from industrialized countries.96 The  evidence for
such a role in lower middle income and poorer countries appears to be zero.
However, it  is important to reiterate that none of these studies are able to
determine whether royalty increases are a result of the exercise of market
power  conferred  by  higher  patent  protection  or  are  evidence of  an  actual
increase in licensing contracts as such.   Even where such an increase in
licensing contracts is found to occur, we have no information on the terms of
such contracts which may inhibit spillovers beyond the licensee.
Higher  patent  protection may lead to  an increase in  the  number of
patents  registered  in  a  country,  and  where  these  are  published  and  fully
92 See p543, Kanwar, Sunil “Intellectual Property Protection and Technology Licensing: The 
Case of Developing Countries” 55 Journal of Law and Economics 539 No. 3 (2012).
93 Smith, Pamela J. "How Do Foreign Patent Rights Affect U.S. Exports, Affiliate Sales, and 
Licenses?" Journal of International Economics 55: 411-440 (2001) cited by p25, Maskus, 
Keith E. “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” ICTSD Issue Paper No. 7, May 
2004. Available at: www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/CS_Maskus.pdf
94 Branstetter, Lee et. al. “Do Stronger Intellectual Property Rights Increase International 
Technology Transfer? Empirical Evidence from U.S. Firm-Level Data,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, vol. 121, 321-349 (2006).
95 p540, Kanwar, Sunil “Intellectual Property Protection and Technology Licensing: The Case 
of Developing Countries” 55 Journal of Law and Economics 539 (2012).
96 Hoekman, Bernard, Maskus, Keith E. and Saggi, Kamal, "Transfer of Technology to 
Developing Countries: Unilateral and Multilateral Policy Options" World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 3332. June 1, 2004. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=610377 (last 
visited 19 February 2014).
disclosed they form a significant part of the learning environment. There is
some evidence that such increases in patent registrations and publications
lead to greater technology absorption in those countries where it takes place.97
This suggests that the disclosure function of the patent system is a key policy
lever  for  enabling  technology  transfer.   However,  the  studies  do  not,  as
Maskus points out, take account of the higher costs and reduced spillovers for
imitation  that  result  from  higher  patent  protection  making  it  difficult  to
generalize an appropriate cost-benefit analysis.98 These findings also do not
examine the consequences of that licensing, namely how rapidly after such
licensing does the technology licensed diffuse into the local economy, at what
rate do spill-overs occur.
The discussion in this section points to at least an ambiguous judgment 
on the virtues of the higher intellectual property standards embodied in the 
TRIPS Agreement.  While the necessity for intellectual property protection is 
clear, the existing information on whether this has led to domestic innovation 
FDI and technology transfer in developing countries suggests that TRIPS may 
not have been an optimal outcome for developing countries.  Nevertheless, 
many developing countries participated in bilateral and regional free trade 
agreements and in the post-TRIPS era that led to them agreeing to higher 
intellectual property standards and to restrictions on regulatory freedom.   The 
next section discusses the structural framework of international treaty making 
on intellectual property that should have militated against such further actions 
and yet still resulted in many agreeing to higher IP standards. We then go on 
to discuss what this implies for their further participation in intellectual property 
negotiating processes.
Part II Multilateralism, Bilateralism and
Economic Development
Intellectual property is a solution to the problem of production of public
goods.  The aim is to provide sufficient incentive for private sector actors to
invest in the generation of new knowledge and products, but to ensure that
there is sufficient spill-over of knowledge during the life-time of the protection
provided and beyond.99  At this basic level,  intellectual  property policy is a
97 p23, Maskus, Keith E. “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” ICTSD Issue Paper 
No. 7, May 2004. Available at: www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/CS_Maskus.pdf (last 
visited 19 February 2014).
98 Id. at p24 
trade-off between present (static) anti-competitive costs and the generation of
future technologies (dynamic cost).  
Achieving a balance between static and dynamic efficiency is complex
enough in a purely domestic market. The problem in a global market is that
there  may  be very  large  international  spill-overs.100  In  a  system with  low
international  trade  in  products  and  services,  such  spill-overs  pose  little
problem as  they  will  tend  to  equalize  over  time.   If  all  countries  provide
protection for their own citizens but no protection for non-citizens, all countries
will  benefit from spill-overs from other countries, and innovators can simply
block products from other countries at the border.  However, in a system with
a  more than  de minimus amount  of  international  trade (both  bilateral  and
multilateral),  the  ability  to  gain  protection  in  multiple  markets  becomes
increasingly important. In a system where there are asymmetries in innovative
capacity  and  thus the  number and  distribution of  rightholders,  there is  an
incentive for countries that are net importers of knowledge and technologies
to  provide  little  or  no  protection  for  rightholders  from  other  countries.101
Countries that are net exporters have a strong incentive to seek protection in
other  countries and,  at  the very least,  to  be treated at  the same level  as
nationals.  This  principle  of  national  treatment is  a  fundamental  element  of
international  treaties  on  intellectual  property.102  It  requires  national  level
policies on spillovers that treat both domestic and foreign rightholders equally,
but does not require that all  countries have the same policies on how and
when to take action to increase or reduce the level  of  spillovers into their
domestic  market.   Of  course,  existing  asymmetries  in  innovative  capacity
suggest that those countries that are net importers may have policies more
focused on ensuring greater spill-overs as most of the rightholders in their
economies  will  be  foreign  rightholders  in  many  cases.   This  may  be  the
strategy that was followed by so-called ‘imitator’ economies such as Japan
and South Korea in the pre-WTO era and now China in the post-WTO era. 
99 See p8, Maskus, Keith & Jerome Reichman (eds.) International Public Goods and Transfer 
of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005).
100 Id. at p9
101 See p284, Maskus, Keith E. and Jerome H. Reichman, "The Globalization of Private 
Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods" 7 Journal of International 
Economic Law 279 (2004).
102 See e.g. Article 2 of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property; Article 3 
of the TRIPS Agreement.
Net  exporter  countries  have  an  incentive  to  seek  not  just  national
treatment, but intellectual property protection on a par with that provided to
firms in their home markets, especially with respect to policies that increase
spillovers and enable faster learning by potential competitors. This dynamic
between net exporter countries and net importer countries results in actions
taken  by  some  countries  that  reduce  or  negatively  affect  the  scope  and
exercise of intellectual property rights, as part of a broader industrial policy
framework.   These  actions  can  be  targeted  at  specific  technologies  and
sectors,  or  can  sometimes  be  economy-wide.  They  can  be  targeted  at
products, or can be targeted at the knowledge itself. 
This back and forth on basic national treatment and harmonization is
the fundamental  dynamic underlying most international intellectual  property
norm-setting.   Beginning  with  the  Berne  Convention103 and  the  Paris
Convention104 the  pattern  was  set  of  treaties  which  required  both  national
treatment  and  established  a  minimum  floor  of  protection  (above  which
countries  were  free  to  increase  but  not  decrease  protection).  With  the
establishment  of  the  International  Bureau  (Bureaux  Internationaux  Réunis
pour la Protection de la Propriété Intellectuelle) and later the World Intellectual
Property Organization, a series of revisions to the Berne Convention and the
Paris  Convention continued to  expand the nature and scope of  protection
provided by the treaties as well as establishing new treaties on related subject
matter.   These continued a slow movement towards greater harmonization
and higher levels of intellectual property protection.  Much of this movement
was  halted  or  significantly  slowed  down  by  the  entry  into  international
intellectual property policymaking of newly independent developing countries
who inherited their membership in BIRPI and later WIPO, and came to believe
that  the  international  economic  system,  including  the  intellectual  property
framework  posed  a  barrier  to  their  economic  development,  including  by
blocking access to technology.105  In negotiations, they sought to increase their
103 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of September 9, 1886, 
completed at Paris on May 4, 1896, revised at Berlin on November 13, 1908, completed at 
Berne on March 20, 1914, revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, revised at Brussels on June 26, 
1948, and revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967 (with Protocol regarding developing 
countries) (“Berne Convention”) in force 29 January 1970, 828 United Nations Treaty Series 
223.
104 Paris Convention for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised at 
Brussels on December 14, 1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 
6, 1925, at London on June 2, 1934, at Lisbon on October 31, 1958, and at Stockholm on July 
14 1967 (“Paris Convention”) in force 26 April 1970, 828 United Nations Treaty Series 107.
105 Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, United Nations 
General Assembly document A/RES/S-6/3201 of 1 May 1974.
flexibility to ensure greater availability of technology in their domestic markets,
and to reduce the barriers that they believed intellectual property posed for
such access.  The Declaration on a New International Economic Order (NIEO)
established  the  principle  of  special  and  differential  treatment  for  least-
developed and developing countries,106 and the signatories committed to:
Giving to the developing countries access to the achievements
of  modern  science  and  technology,  and  promoting  the  transfer  of
technology and the creation of indigenous technology for the benefit of
the developing countries in forms and in accordance with procedures
which are suited to their economies;107
The NIEO did not succeed in its broader goals and its principles were not
included in the structure of international IP policymaking. Forum shifting of the
intellectual property issue finally resulted in intellectual property being address
in the framework of the Uruguay Round negotiations for the WTO leading to
the establishment of the TRIPS Agreement. 
TRIPS reflected the consensus that had developed since the NIEO, 
that the best framework for ensuring innovation and access to technology for 
developing countries was voluntary, market based transactions between firms 
and increasing domestic absorption and creative capacity. The basic 
underlying premise is that interventions must address market failures in IP-
protected intangibles and may not simply be based on industrial or public 
policy goals. 
TRIPS implementation is required of WTO members108 with expected 
pay-offs in respect of market access and FDI. For developing countries, a 
significant element was market access in agriculture, as well as industrial 
goods and services. For the US and Europe, greater scope for intellectual 
property protection subject to international dispute settlement was a critical 
element of the Uruguay Round.109  A broad agreement such as the one that 
came out of the Uruguay Round is an inevitable compromise balancing the 
interests of multiple countries and multiple business actors.  The negotiations 
were complex and involved almost all economic sectors in most countries.  
106 Para 4(c), Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 
United Nations General Assembly document A/RES/S-6/3201 of 1 May 1974.
107 Para 4(p), Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 
United Nations General Assembly document A/RES/S-6/3201 of 1 May 1974.
108 Although least-developed country members have been given several additional years to 
comply.  
Some delegations were able to be present in all elements of negotiations, 
many others were not.110  The final content of the negotiations was really only 
able to be assessed in the period after signature and ratification.  It is in that 
period that many developing countries began to realize what it was they had 
truly signed up to in the TRIPS Agreement.  In particular, in patent-related 
discussions  regarding public health, the case brought by the group of 
international pharmaceutical companies against South Africa111, raised 
international awareness of the restrictions that TRIPS placed on countries to 
address major public health issues.112 In multilateral fora, developing countries 
began to react against higher intellectual property standards. They blocked 
further harmonization initiatives such as the Substantive Patent Law Treaty113 
at WIPO, delayed others such as the WIPO Treaty on the Protection of 
Broadcasting Organizations114, and kept issues such as such as intellectual 
property enforcement off the WTO agenda. They began to seek changes in 
existing international norms at the WTO and at WIPO that they believed would 
be more favorable to developing countries.  At the WTO, this resulted in the 
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health115, and ongoing proposals for 
109 See para 3.11, “The Uruguay Round” European Commission - MEMO/94/24, 12/04/1994. 
Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-94-24_en.htm (last visited 19 
February 2014).
110 See p4, CUTS “Developing Country Participation in the GATT: A Reassessment” CUTS 
Center for International Trade, Economics and Environment Briefing paper, August 2009.
111 Notice  of  Motion  in  the  High  Court  of  South  Africa  (Transvaal  Provincial  Division),  
Case 
No. 4183/98.
112  See e.g. MSF “South Africa: Big Pharma Backs Down” MSF International Activity 
Report 2001. Available at: 
https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/ar/report.cfm?id=1204; CPTech 
“Court Case Between 39 Pharmaceutical Firms and The South African Government” 
Available at: http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/pharma-v-sa.html (last visited 19 
February 2014).
113 See WIPO “Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty” Available at: http://www.wipo.int/patent-
law/en/draft_splt.htm (last visited 19 February 2014).
114 See WIPO “Broadcasting Organizations” 
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/activities/broadcast.html (last visited 19 February 2014).
115 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001)
disclosure of origin of genetic resources.116 At WIPO, this included beginning 
negotiations for treaties on the protection of Traditional Knowledge and 
Folklore,117 and the establishment of the WIPO Development Agenda. The 
WIPO Development Agenda is of particular note because it represents both a 
shift in the view of the institutional role of WIPO but also a broader 
philosophical shift in the view of the role of intellectual property protection in 
international economic development discussions.
The Development Agenda was the outcome of several years of 
pressure by civil society and developing countries raising serious concerns 
regarding the implications of WIPO activities for sustainable development.  
Negotiations finally concluded in October 2007. The Development Agenda 
consists of 45 recommendations in 6 clusters: 
- Cluster A: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building
- Cluster B: Norm-setting, flexibilities, public policy and public domain
- Cluster C: Technology Transfer, Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) and Access to Knowledge
- Cluster D: Assessment, Evaluation and Impact Studies
- Cluster E: Institutional Matters including Mandate and Governance
- Cluster F: Other Issues
The Agenda reflects the key principle of special and differential 
treatment for developing countries: that intellectual property cannot be a one 
size fits all proposition and must be accommodated to the development status 
and needs of each country. This applies to technical assistance but also norm-
setting.118 Technical assistance and norm-setting are required to take into 
account full use of TRIPS flexibilities and not simply implementation of the 
highest IP standards.119 WIPO is also explicitly required to take into account 
the broader international sustainable development framework, including the 
116 WTO “Draft decision to enhance mutual supportiveness between the TRIPS agreement 
and the Convention on Biological Diversity: Communication from Brazil, China, Colombia, 
Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru, Thailand, the ACP group, and the African group” TN/C/W/59,
19 April 2011. 
117 WIPO, “Intergovernmental Committee” http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc/ (last visited 19 
February 2014).
118 DA recommendation 15
119 DA recommendation 14 and 17
Millennium Development Goals. The Development Agenda has been 
embraced by both member states and the institution and is transforming the 
basis and goals on which WIPO works.  The most recent and concrete 
example of this is the recent conclusion of the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate 
Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or 
Otherwise Print Disabled120 in June 2013. The treaty was the first of its kind to 
be devoted to an agreement on exceptions and limitations to intellectual 
property (in this case copyright) and that explicitly referenced human rights121 
(in particular the rights of the disabled) and the Development Agenda122  in its 
preamble. 
The Development Agenda gains even more importance in light of the 
Cooperation Agreement with the WTO in 1995 that WIPO in charge of 
providing technical assistance for TRIPS implementation to developing 
country members of the WTO. In fact according to Article 4 of the WTO–WIPO 
Cooperation Agreement:
The International Bureau [WIPO] shall make available to developing 
country WTO Members which are not Member States of WIPO the 
same legal–technical assistance relating to the TRIPS Agreement as it 
makes available to Member States of WIPO which are developing 
countries. The WTO Secretariat shall make available to Member States 
of WIPO which are developing countries and are not WTO Members 
the same technical cooperation relating to the TRIPS Agreement as it 
makes available to developing country WTO Members.123
Under the agreement WIPO offers its expertise in the area of intellectual 
property law to WTO and non-WTO Member States so as to ensure a 
120 Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, 
Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled signed at Marrakesh June 27, 2013 (not yet in 
force)
121 “Recalling the principles of non-discrimination, equal opportunity, accessibility and full and 
effective participation and inclusion in society, proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”
122 “Recalling the importance of the Development Agenda recommendations, adopted in 2007 
by the General Assembly of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which aim 
to ensure that development considerations form an integral part of the Organization’s work”
123 The WTO–WIPO agreement can be found at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtowip_e.htm (last visited 19 February 2014).
successful implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. The nature and content 
of such assistance is crucial to whether developing countries can implement 
the TRIPS Agreement in ways that are favorable to their development and 
leave sufficient flexibility to address issues such as public health, access to 
information and misappropriation of traditional knowledge and folklore. 
Philosophically, in multilateral fora developing countries have 
succeeded in transforming the IP discourse when they have connected the 
pure IP issue, not to trade issues as happened in the TRIPS Agreement but to 
other frameworks such as human rights and, biodiversity. This was the case 
with public health, and with traditional knowledge. The key goal of the 
Development Agenda is to create a framework for norm-setting, technical 
assistance and policy research that focuses on the needs of developing 
nations in the broader framework of sustainable development.124 The 
Development Agenda drew from several developments in international fora 
regarding sustainable development, including the re-invigoration of a rights-
based approach to economic development issues. This meant not only 
revisiting the ‘right to development’ debate begun during the NIEO debate, but 
also developing the framework on economic social and cultural rights. This 
saw the development of the framework on Article 15 (1) of the International 
Convention on Economic Social and Cultural Rights which includes  “The 
Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Application (ICESCR 
Article 15(1)(b))
The scope and full legal meaning of Article 15(1)(b) has yet to be 
articulated. While conceptually attractive, there is very little literature on the 
relation of this article to technology transfer. In addition to analyzing its text, it 
must read in the context of Article 15(1) as a whole, which also establish 
rights to benefit from one’s own creations, which has sometimes been read as 
a ‘right’ to intellectual property.125 More extensively developed has been the 
issue of the right to health and its relationship to the TRIPS Agreement.  The 
development and push for the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 
124 A Koury Menescal, ‘Changing WIPO’s Ways? The 2004 Development Agenda in Historical 
Perspective’ (2005) 8 J Of World Intellectual Property, 761.
125 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights views the provisions as a unitary
set,  despite the fact  that  it  has chosen to  elaborate  different  sets  General  Comments to
address each one. Thus it requires States to recognize the right of everyone: 
(a) To take part in cultural life; 
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; 
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author. 
drew on the rights-based approach to health that had developed in the human 
rights bodies in terms of requiring states to deliver health services and goods 
to their citizens. The right to access medicines at an affordable price was first 
established in the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Right’s 
General Comment 14 on the right to the highest attainable standard of health.  
This was further elaborated by the Committee in its examination of country 
reports especially looking at the new measures in the post-TRIPS bilateral 
free trade agreements. In particular, as civil society brought forward concerns 
regarding TRIPS-plus provisions in bilateral FTAs126 the Committee raised 
concerns about the ways that signing such FTAs could negatively affect 
delivery on the right to health.127  These were concerns that harked back to 
concerns regarding the TRIPS Agreement expressed by Paul Hunt, the 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health in his 2004 report to the 
Commission on Human Rights, discussing concerns that TRIPS may 
negatively impact access to medicines.128
The  human  rights  discourse  also  served  as  a  useful  framing  for
developing countries who argued that their obligations to deliver on the right
to health could not and should not be interfered with by the TRIPS obligations.
While  powerful  as  a  rhetorical  tool,  and  led  to  the  adoption  of  the  Doha
Declaration  on  TRIPS  and  Public  Health  as  well  as  pushes  to  address
neglected diseases at the WHO, this framing did not result in any significant
amendment of the TRIPS Agreement obligations on patent protection.  While
the Doha Declaration was an important milestone,  during the negotiations,
developed countries pushed hard to limit its scope, losing out on limiting the
scope  of  disease  coverage,  but  largely  winning  in  limiting  the  agreement
largely  to  Article  31  compulsory  licensing  issues  rather  than  a  broader
The  Committee  is  progressively  addressing  the  article  and  has  produced  two  general
comments on 15(1)(a) and (15(1)(c). 
126 See e.g. 3DThree “”Trade-related intellectual property rights, access to medicines and 
human rights – Morocco ”April 2006, submission to the Committee on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights
127 See E.g. para 29, OHCHR “CONSIDERATION OF REPORTS SUBMITTED BY STATES 
PARTIES UNDER ARTICLES 16 AND 17 OF THE COVENANT: Concluding observations of 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – MOROCCO” , .
128 See para. 43, ECOSOC “ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS - The right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health - 
Report of the Special Rapporteur, Paul Hunt – Addendum -Mission to the World Trade 
Organization” E/CN.4/2004/49/Add.1, 1 March 2004 
agreement expanding the scope of uncompensated exceptions and limitations
under  article  30.  Nevertheless,  the  human  rights  discourse  and  the
Development  Agenda  have  served  to  transform  the  nature  and  scope  of
multilateral policy-making on intellectual property.  The system is no longer
solely  focused  on  what  has  been  called  the  “upward  ratchet”,  of  ever
increasing  intellectual  property  standards.129 Integrated  within  a  broader
discussion and framework, multilateral IP fora have become contested arenas
where the evidence (empirical and otherwise) for the effectiveness and utility
of differing levels of intellectual property is in play.
The Unfinished business of the TRIPS Agreement: Intellectual property 
in Bilateral and regional FTAs
The significant shift in the framing of intellectual property in 
international IP – related fora should not blind us to the fact that TRIPS 
standards have become the floor for international intellectual property 
protection. However, the developments at WIPO and the WTO also point to 
another crucial viewpoint on the TRIPS Agreement. Whereas many 
developing countries viewed it as going too far, major industries in the US and 
Europe, pharmaceutical and entertainment in particular, viewed the TRIPS 
Agreement as not going far enough.  The broader critique was that the TRIPS 
Agreement left too much flexibility in its standards, and that it left out crucial 
subject matter. For example, the TRIPS Agreement did not succeed in limiting 
the grounds for compulsory licenses, nor did it clearly establish a requirement 
for data exclusivity for test data information. For Europe, the key issue of 
protection of geographical indications remained incomplete. These 
dissatisfactions are reflected in the content of the bilateral and regional free 
trade agreements that proliferated in the aftermath of the WTO Agreement.
The perceived gap in TRIPS standards, combined with the multilateral 
push back by developing countries led to a significant expansion in bilateral 
and regional free trade agreement negotiations, now with added intellectual 
property chapters and provisions.  The post-TRIPS negotiations were 
modeled on the Uruguay Round negotiations themselves, providing for 
comprehensive multi-sector, multi-issue negotiations  based on the single 
undertaking principle – that all issues were negotiated as part of a single 
bargain and could not be concluded separately. This ensured that a similar 
dynamic in terms of capacity to participate, as well as in terms of bargaining 
across issued would prevail.  Sometimes many of these agreements 
addressed investment as well, although many bilateral investment 
129 See Sell, S “The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement 
Efforts: The State of Play”. PIJIP Research Paper no. 15. American University Washington 
College of Law, Washington, DC, 2010.
agreements were concluded separately as investment has historically been 
treated as a separate issue from trade.
The move to bilateral and regional FTAs had very specific goals in 
mind. The US took the first steps and signed a significant number very early 
on, but Europe followed suit very quickly.  Tellingly, the majority of these 
involved asymmetric negotiations between the major economy and one or 
more trading partners usually those who were in already some form of 
preferential and non-reciprocal trade arrangement. Generally, the developed 
country used a template for the intellectual property provisions. For the US, 
the areas pursued by these FTAs included:
Patent
- Clinical test data exclusivity130
- Patent term extension due to regulatory delay
- Limiting the use of compulsory licensing to working requirements, 
emergencies, government use and addressing anti-competitive 
practices131
- Patent term extension for delays in pharmaceutical marketing 
approval132
Copyright
- Temporary reproductions, even in computer memory were to be 
treated as reproductions within the meaning of copyright133
- Criminalization and protection of technological protection measures 
to include prohibition of production or trade in circumvention tools134
- Extension of term to life of the author plus 70 years135
Trademarks
130 Article 4.19, US-Jordan FTA
131 Article 4.20 US-Jordan FTA
132 Article 4.23 US-Jordan FTA
133 Article 4.10, US-Jordan FTA; Article 17.4(1) US-Australia FTA
134 Article 4.13, US-Jordan FTA
135 Article 17.4(4) US-Australia FTA
- Protection for well-known marks beyond confusion136
- Extension of subject matter to sounds and scents137
-
Enforcement
- Enabling ex officio action in seeking criminal liability for IP 
infringement
- Expanding the definition of commercial use
The US was historically, the largest user of FTAs. As of November 
2013, the US had bilateral and regional free trade agreements in force with 20 
countries.138 These include developing countries such as: CAFTA-DR (Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic), Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Jordan, Morocco, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Singapore.139 The 
US is also conducting negotiations with significant IP components with several 
countries in the pacific region with the aim of creating a Trans-pacific 
Partnership (TTP) Agreement.140 Negotiations have also begun on a 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Agreement with the 
European Union, also with intellectual property components.141  However, 
there has been little or no movement by the US towards negotiating significant 
agreements with large developing countries such as South Africa, Brazil, India 
or China.   The TPP conspicuously excludes China from its ambit, while 
including almost a significant number of its regional neighbours.142 
136 Article 4.8, US-Jordan FTA
137 Article 17.2(2), US-Australia FTA
138 See http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited 19 February 
2014).
139 Id. 
140 See http://www.ustr.gov/tpp (last visited 19 February 2014).
141 See http://www.ustr.gov/ttip (last visited 19 February 2014).
142 Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States.
The EU has also pursued FTAs in the post-WTO phase but with a 
slightly differing pattern. The relationship with other developing countries had 
largely been managed through the African, Pacific and Caribbean group 
process, within large scale agreements addressing political, human rights, 
trade and aid issues. Thus the existing set of agreements that the EU had 
with developing countries were based on non-reciprocal asymmetric 
obligations. However, that changed in 2006. Ending an informal moratorium143, 
the EU began in late 2006 to increase its activity in negotiating bilateral trade 
agreements. The European Commission explicitly included a TRIPS-Plus 
mandate in its trade goals, stating that, “[t]he EU should seek to strengthen 
IPR [Intellectual Property Right] provisions in future bilateral agreements... .”144
The EU applied this principle in new negotaitons for Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) with the 76 member African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
group of countries.  These agreements aimed to significantly change the 
traditional non-reciprocal trade preference relationship that existed between 
the EU and ACP group of countries.145
The EU pursued higher intellectual property standards by asking 
countries to accede to the WIPO Copyright Tretay and the WIPO 
Peformances and Phonograms Treaty; 146 sui generis protection for non-
original databases; specific protection for technological protection 
mechanisms; accession to UPOV 1991, and protection of geographical 
indications beyond wines and spirits.  The largest focus was on enforcment, 
seeking standards that were the same as those in Europe.147 While 
negotiations began in 2006, the only agreement signed and in force to date is 
that with the CARIFORUM group of countries.148 That agreement reflect the 
intensive focus of the EU on increasing enforcement standards. All other 
143 See p11, Evenett, S “Global Europe: An Initial Assessment of the European Commission’s 
New Trade Policy” Journal Aussenwirtschaft, Volume 61, Number IV, 2007 (Available at 
http://www.imd.org/uupload/EvianGroup/PUBLICATIONS/1456.pdf (last visited 19 February 
2014).
144 European Commission “Global Europe: competing in the world” EC Policy Review, 
October 4, 2006 (available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/competitiveness/global_europe_en.htm (last visited 
19 February 2014).), Section v.
145 For more detail on the aims and goals of these negotiations see D Shabalala 
“The European Approach to IP in European Partnership Agreements with the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of Countries” (CIEL, April 2007). Available at:
h  t  t p :  / / www . c i e l  . org / Pu b li  c a ti  on s / E U _EP A s_ D raf t _18 A pr07 . pd f ) (last visited 19 
February 2014).
146 Draft EPA text for West Africa Chapter 2, Section 2, Article 6
member groups of the ACP have refused to sign full agreements with 
intellectual property and other rules chapters, relying on interim agreements 
that addressed only goods issues.  
Unlike the US, the EU has also sought to negotiate agreements with 
larger developing countries, pursuing negotiations with India149 (still ongoing 
as of November 2013) with intellectual property a major sticking point; and 
with Mercosur150, although these negotiations have been largely moribund.  
Again, there has been no attempt to pursue such an agreement with China.
The pattern of negotiations and failure of trade negotiations reflects the 
pattern of asymmetric power in negotiations on intellectual property between 
developed and eveloping countries.  To the extent that countries in the ACP, in 
Latin America, and in South East Asia have signed such agreements, many 
have done so to preserve market access that had previously been made 
available on a non-reciprocal basis and was now being subject to the 
reciprocity principle set up by the WTO.  The US and the EU have found it 
much harder to persuade countries that were not dependent on preferential 
market access to participate. Thus bilateral and regional free trade 
agreements may not have had the outcome that may have been intially hoped 
for. However, for those countries that have signed bilateral and regional free 
trade agreements, the effect goes beyond simply extending privileges to those 
countries with whom they have signed such agreements. The TRIPS 
Agreement contains no exceptions to  non-discriminatory  Most  Favored  
Nation  treatment for  regional  free  trade  agreements,  thus  countries that 
sign up to such agreements are obligated to extend their new standards to all 
WTO members automatically.  These agreements have the effect of 
mulitlateralizing bilateral obligations on intellectual property in fora that are 
external to those such as the WTO and WIPO, where developing countries 
have succeeded in moderating and reframing the intellectual property and 
147 See D Shabalala “The European Approach to IP in European Partnership Agreements 
with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of Countries” (CIEL, April 2007). Available at: 
h  t  t p :  / / www . c i e l  . org / Pu b li  c a ti  on s / E U _EP A s_ D raf t _18 A pr07 . pd f ) (last visited 19 February 
2014).
148 See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/caribbean/ (last visited 
19 February 2014).
149 See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/india/ (last visited 19 
February 2014).
150 See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/mercosur/ (last visited 
19 February 2014).
development discourse. Despite this however, it is clear that many developing 
countries have resisted this forum shopping on intellectual property.
Outside of the negotiations involving developing countries in 
preferential trade arrangements who agreed to new reciprocal arrangements, 
developed countries began to run into difficulties in their pursuit of higher and 
stronger intellectual property standards.  For the EU, this has been evident in 
its pursuit of agreements with other ACP regional groups outside of the 
Caribbean.  These have resisted and continue to resist the addition of non-
core ‘rules’ issues such as intellectual property in the negotiations.  Thus 
negotiations with the West Africa, the Pacific, the Eastern and South African 
group, all point to a failure of inclusion of intellectual property.
For the US, outside of its traditional sphere of economic influence in 
preferential agreements in South and Central America, there has been little 
progress in bilateral agreements with IP provisions. The US has not 
concluded an agreement with IP provisions with any sub-Saharan country, 
with any South-Asian country and in the Asia-pacific region, with one 
exception, namely Singapore.151
Neither the US nor the EU has been successful in persuading the 
major emerging economies of Brazil, India and China to agree to higher 
intellectual property standards in bilateral negotiations. The EU’s negotiations 
with India, which started in 2007, came to a standstill over IPRs, particularly 
with regard to the contentious issue of protection for pharmaceutical products 
and the exclusivity over clinical trial test data desired by the EU. The 
negotiations were officially expected to conclude in 2012, but that timeline 
proved too optimistic.152 The key priority of India’s strong domestic 
pharmaceutical industry and civil society is access to affordable medicines, as 
guaranteed by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) and the 2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health. India is also asking the EU to screen the 
validity of European patents against prior use in traditional Indian medicine 
and knowledge related to Indian genetic resources.  For the moment it 
appears that no agreement on intellectual property will be reached. The US 
has continued to pursue regional bilateral IP standards as can been in the 
newly launched, negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
involving Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, 
151 The United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement was signed on 6 May 2003 and 
implemented by both countries by 1 January 2004.
152 See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/india/ (last 
visited 19 February 2014).
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. 
Notably absent from this list is China. 
The absence of China from the present rounds of bilateral and regional 
free trade agreements, suggests one major impetus for nevertheless pursuing 
bilateral and regional free trade agreements: the encirclement of China. 
Innovative IPR-driven Asia-Pacific economies (Japan, South Korea, 
Singapore), Australia, New Zealand, the US and the EU are all seemingly 
engaged in a policy of ‘encirclement’ of China, i.e. ensuring that China’s major 
and regional trading partners are committed to providing more effective IP 
enforcement, especially with regard to border controls and customs controls 
aimed at preventing trade in and importation of pirated and counterfeit goods. 
It is in this context that initiatives such as the TPP and ACTA (discussed 
further below), are relevant.
The Limits of Bilateralism and the rise of Plurilateralism?
The limits of the bilateral approach have led to some new 
developments in international IP approaches.  The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) represented the first plurilateral IP specific negotiations 
without any connection to other negotiations or a single undertaking, outside 
WIPO and the WTO.  ACTA was in many ways a forum-shifting exercise born 
out of the frustration over the lack of progress on the fight against piracy and 
counterfeiting at the WTO.153 Countries such as Brazil, India and China had 
systematically blocked the topic of intellectual property enforcement from the 
agenda of the WTO Council for TRIPS. Equally, at WIPO issues of 
enforcement are discussed merely at the level of an advisory committee.154 
ACTA can also be seen as a consolidation of provisions related to the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights contained in the parties’ bilateral 
and regional free trade agreements; in fact all ACTA states were connected 
through FTAs in one way or another.155 
153 Kaminski, M. Recent Development: The Origins and Potential Impact of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 34 Yale Journal of International Law 247 (2009).
154 WIPO ‘Mandate of WIPO Advisory Committee on Enforcement’, WO/GA/28/7, 
www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=14890 
155 See www.bilaterals.org (last visited 19 February 2014).
The ACTA negotiations were concluded, after 11 rounds, in October 
2010 in Tokyo. The final text was published on 3 December 2010.156 On 1 
October 2011, Australia, Canada, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, South 
Korea, Singapore and the United States signed the agreement during a 
ceremony in Tokyo. On 27 January 2012, twenty-two EU member states (UK, 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden) signed ACTA.  During the 
negotiations, many critical questions from within ACTA countries had been 
raised over to the lack of transparency and the nature and content of the 
treaty.  This extended to the European Parliamnet which rejected the treaty on 
4 July 2012 by 478 votes to 39, with 165 abstentions. Controversy persists in 
the US due to the failure to seek Senate ratification. The Obama 
administration characterised ACTA as a ‘sole executive agreement’, which 
means that implementing legislation or changes to the national regime are not 
foreseen. 
Third countries were vocal in their rejection of ACTA and its genesis. 
Paradoxically, the treaty prompted the tabling of the issue of enforcement on 
the agenda of in the TRIPS Council for the first time. The Indian delegation 
remarked in October 2009 that: “the ACTA agreement was being negotiated in 
secrecy and with the exclusion of a vast majority of countries, including 
developing countries and LDCs.”157 In June 2010, China, India and Brazil 
commented upon draft versions of ACTA,158 stating that ACTA was inconsistent 
with the letter and spirit of the TRIPS Agreement. In October 2010,159 again in 
the TRIPS Council, India complained about the fact that ACTA bypassed the 
multilateral process and completely ignored the interests of other WTO 
members.160 India also voiced its concern over the nature and scope of ACTA 
156 See http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST
%2012196%202011%20INIT (last visited 19 February 2014) for the official text.
157 ‘Minutes of Meeting Held In The Centre William Rappard on 27-28 October en 6 
November 2009’ Council on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property, IP/C/M/61, 12 
February 2010, par. 264.
158 ‘Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 8-9 June 2010’ Council on 
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property, IP/C/M/63, 4 October 2010, par. 252.
159 ‘Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 26-27 October 2010’ Council 
on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property, IP/C/M/64, 17 February 2011.
160 Id. 
with regard to transit procedures, injunctions, and the way in which treaty re-
interprets the term ‘commercial scale’. 
The failure of ACTA is twofold: it failed to convince domestic 
constituencies even in major proponent countries of its value and it failed to 
convince key third parties of its usefulness. It also suffered from a structural 
problem: the failure to  include the emerging market countries that are 
perceived by European and US stakeholders to be the main sources of 
counterfeit products.  It is not clear what incentive such emerging markets 
would have had to particpate or accede to ACTA. In a single issue negotiation 
such as ACTA they would not gain any further access or guarantees in other 
sectors and would in any case, benefit from the existing legal provisions in 
ACTA members. Unlike for goods, there is no regional or FTA exception 
(GATT Article XXIV) in the TRIPS Agreement. Therefore, ACTA Parties would 
not have been able to discriminate against non-ACTA WTO parties in their 
implementation of their IP obligations unless they could clearly describe those 
provisions as unequivocally TRIP-plus obligations that are not covered by the 
national treatment and MFN clauses in TRIPS Articles 3 and 4.  This would 
however be very difficult as those articles apply to protection of intellectual 
property subject matter covered by the agreement.  Non-ACTA parties would 
therefore already benefit from the enforcement that ACTA parties would have 
been obliged to provide for their citizens.
Conclusion: New venues, old venues - Multilateralism and a return to
WIPO?
The difficulties encountered by industrialized countries in expanding 
intellectual property provisions through bilateral and regional agreements 
appear to have exhausted to a certain extent the alternative venues for 
increasing and harmonizing intellectual property.  The growth of inter-linkages 
with other regimes such as human rights, biodiversity, and climate change 
suggest that a pure focus on increasing rights may no longer be viable. The 
resistance of many developing countries, even in bilateral and regional free 
trade agreements, means that the international discourse on intellectual 
property and development may have permanently shifted, whatever forum 
intellectual property is raised in.  The failure of ACTA suggests that the 
domestic constituency for greater protection of intellectual property in 
developed countries may no longer be as monolithic and influential as it once 
was.  The increasing internal debate in industrialized economies on the 
relationship between intellectual property and economic, social and human 
rights has also played a part in refashioning how intellectual property is 
pursued by these countries.  It may be that the future holds a return to 
multilateral fora, where intellectual property standards may now be discussed 
on a new basis, reflecting the historical principles of special and differential 
treatment for developing countries, addressing new subject matter of interest 
and demand for developing countries, and above, all, the enshrining of the 
principle of flexibility and policy space in new treaties. This requires the 
recognition of existing policy space and the creation of new policy space, 
focusing on the process of graduated increases in protection related to stage 
of development, as occurred with Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Japan.  This 
means a stronger focus on the interaction between markets and the creation 
of appropriate market conditions under which intellectual property protection 
can be seen to contribute positively.
The flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement can be used to allow WTO 
members to develop at their own pace. IPRs can serve to create a market for 
intellectual and industrial creativity and serve as a conduit for technology 
transfer, while also being adjusted and modified to address the fact that more 
substantive IPRs do not automatically lead to more investment or innovation 
and that more active interventions may be required. Market conditions in 
developing countries are often marred by corruption, lack of transparency, 
market access and human capital, and the inability to absorb technology and 
knowledge. Inclusion of developing countries in the world knowledge 
economy, however, does offer opportunities for development. This is 
supported by the economic progress in developing economies like India, 
China and Brazil. Effective enforcement and the establishment of minimum 
IPR standards form the conditions for including developing economies in the 
global marketplace. However active policies ensuring sufficient learning and 
spillovers are also required. Thus constant calibration and balancing are likely 
to be the future of intellectual property policy-making in developing countries 
and multilateral fora, rather than the pursuit of purely higher intellectual 
property standards.
